The ability to generate and use large amounts of information about patient and population health, health-care treatment, and the outcomes of care represents a fundamental breakthrough in health-care quality improvement and population health management. Creating and using what has become known as “big data” raises many legal issues, as this installment of Law and the Public’s Health describes.

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BIG DATA AND PUBLIC HEALTH: NAVIGATING PRIVACY LAWS TO MAXIMIZE POTENTIAL

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This installment of Law and the Public’s Health examines the constellation of laws governing health information privacy and their application to big data in public health. Big data holds great promise for public health, given the nature of services such as monitoring population health status, evaluating population-based health service quality, and conducting research for innovative solutions. These activities require the ability to collect volumes of information, rapidly interpret data, and monitor data for long periods of time—all functions that are the hallmark of big data solutions. Despite misconceptions about health information privacy laws, the legal framework is quite permissive and need not operate as a barrier.

This article defines big data, provides an overview of how laws related to health information privacy apply to big data, and discusses the implications of this framework for public health policy and practice.

BACKGROUND

“Big data” is characterized by three Vs—volume, velocity, and variety—and cannot be managed with standard database processing methods. Big data’s value is in its use—combining large amounts of information from multiple sources into a single dataset permits identification of correlations and patterns that would be hidden in siloed datasets. Access to a single big dataset allows users to fill in information gaps and check for consistency, capturing a more accurate picture of the population being evaluated. Big data technologies also permit the storage of volumes of information indefinitely so that data can be used in the future for a purpose other than that for which they were originally collected (i.e., a secondary use). The University of Pittsburgh is demonstrating the value of secondary uses through Project Tycho, which put 88 million disease reports published since 1888 in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC’s) Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report into an open-access database. The team used the database to demonstrate the effect of vaccinations on diseases such as polio, and other uses neither considered nor possible when the information was first collected.

Solutions for data collection, storage, processing, and analysis have become abundant and affordable, permitting users across industries to manage the size, speed, and complexity of big data. These technological advancements have ushered in what some herald as the “big data revolution,” although its full potential in the health-care sector has not been realized due to financing, interoperability issues, and legal concerns related to information privacy and security.

HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY AND THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR BIG DATA

The health information privacy framework is a patchwork of often-overlapping federal and state laws that regulate specific types of information, individuals, and organizations. Confusion related to the scope and application of this framework, as well as the complexity of the laws, has made the framework a perceived barrier to big data use. However, the framework permits many big data uses that are beneficial to public health.

Federal laws and regulations

The Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). The HIPAA Privacy Rule governs “protected health information” (PHI), which is individually identifiable information about an individual’s care, health condition, or payment for care. The Privacy Rule does not govern “de-identified information,” information from which 18 identifiers are removed or that an expert determines carries a minimal risk of being able to identify an individual if used. The Privacy Rule applies to “covered entities” (i.e., health plans, health-care clearinghouses, and most health-care providers) and their “business associates” (i.e.,
entities having access to or using PHI when performing
specified functions or services for the covered entity),
collectively referred to herein as “regulated entities.”
Regulated entities are required to disclose PHI to
the individual subject of the information or his/her
designated representative and to the Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for
purposes of investigations or enforcement. Regulated
entities may disclose most PHI to anyone else with
the individual’s authorization, and are permitted (but not
required) to disclose PHI without authorization in
accordance with one of many permissive disclosure
exceptions.\footnote{14}

Treatment, payment, and operations. Generally, regulated
entities may disclose PHI without authorization for
treatment purposes (e.g., patient care delivery), pay-
ment activities (e.g., payment for services), and health-
care operations (e.g., quality improvement efforts).\footnote{15}

Public health activities. Regulated entities may disclose
PHI without authorization to legally authorized public
health entities for purposes related to preventing or
controlling disease, injury, or disability (e.g., disease
reporting, surveillance, and interventions).\footnote{16} Subject
to limitations, the Privacy Rule identifies six other
public health activities for which disclosure is permis-
sible, including disclosure to a person exposed to a
communicable disease and immunization reporting
to a school.\footnote{17}

Other exceptions. The Privacy Rule identifies 11 other
purposes for which disclosure may be made without
authorization.\footnote{18} These exceptions are limited to specific
activities that are beneficial to the public, including for
national security purposes, certain law enforcement
activities, and research, if a privacy or an institutional
review board (IRB) has waived or altered the author-
ization requirement, or if the PHI will only be used
for certain limited purposes.

Limited datasets. Regulated entities may disclose a lim-
ited dataset without authorization for research, public
health, or health-care operations.\footnote{19} A limited dataset is
PHI devoid of 16 specified identifiers, but may include
city, state, and ZIP code; dates; and characters or codes
that are not direct identifiers. The parties exchanging
the dataset must enter into a data use agreement gov-
erning the use of the limited dataset(s).

The Common Rule. The Common Rule protects most
human subjects involved in federally funded research\footnote{20}
as well as individually identifiable private information
obtained from a subject,\footnote{21} and generally requires either
IRB approval and patient consent or IRB waiver of the
consent requirement.\footnote{22} The Common Rule does not
govern studies conducted using existing patient inform-
ation, observation of public behavior, or survey or
interview procedures. The Common Rule also exempts
studies using existing data, records, or bio-specimens
if the results do not reveal the subject’s identity or if
the data sources are publicly available.\footnote{23}

The Genetic Information Nondisclosure Act of 2008 (GINA).
GINA generally prohibits health plans from using
genetic information to make coverage-related decisions
and requesting that beneficiaries undergo genetic test-
ing or provide genetic information.\footnote{24} GINA also gener-
ally prohibits employers from discriminating against
employees or applicants based on genetic information
and from using genetic information in employment
decisions, subject to exceptions.\footnote{25} Employers may
disclose genetic information in certain circumstances,
including to an occupational or health researcher
and to a public health organization if the information
relates to a contagious disease presenting an imminent
threat of serious harm or death.\footnote{26}

42 C.F.R. Part 2 (Part 2). Part 2 applies to substance
abuse programs that are federally assisted,\footnote{27} which
includes providers who participate in Medicare, have
a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration number, or are
federally tax exempt.\footnote{28} Providers must obtain writ-
ten patient consent to disclose information that could
identify that individual as a substance abuser,\footnote{29} with
limited exceptions, including identifying disclosures for
purposes of a state-mandated inquiry into a patient’s
cause of death,\footnote{30} child abuse reporting,\footnote{31} and certain
research activities.\footnote{32}

State laws and regulations
States define their own privacy framework, which
typically includes laws governing the same entities,
activities, and/or types of information as the all fed-
eral laws.\footnote{33} Generally, providers must comply with all
federal laws and any state requirements that are more
protective.\footnote{34} States often provide enhanced protections
for certain sensitive information (e.g., human immuno-
deficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
test results\footnote{35} and mental health information),\footnote{36} and for
some vulnerable populations (e.g., minors). State laws
and regulations are relevant to the extent that they
restrict disclosure of identifiable information more
than federal laws, and entities that disclose or use
identifiable information must be aware of how their
state regulates sensitive information. Additionally, states
often require reporting of certain information related
to communicable diseases, and generally maintain and
mandate reporting to condition-specific (e.g., cancer) registries that support public health surveillance and research activities.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE AND POLICY**

Understanding the federal framework for privacy is critical for big data use. While every law permits disclosure of health information with patient consent, obtaining consent may be impracticable, particularly for population-based activities. A number of exceptions permit disclosure of health information without consent, enabling public health functions. Unregulated domains outside the framework also present opportunities to make robust use of big data solutions.

**Public health exceptions**

Each federal law has carved out exceptions for basic public health services. HIPAA’s exception is the broadest, permitting regulated entities to disclose PHI without authorization for activities related to preventing or controlling disease, injury, or disability. Traditional public health activities such as tracking disease outbreaks, monitoring use of certain drugs, and targeting preventive screenings are all exempted. One recent example is a New York database created by public health officials, which tracks prescription drug disbursement so that providers can determine if an individual has an existing prescription. In its first year, the database received seven million queries from 66,000 providers, reducing doctor shopping by 75%.

**Health-care operations**

HIPAA’s exception for health-care operations is quite permissive, encompassing many population health activities. For example, the National Drug Early Warning System, created by the University of Maryland’s Center for Substance Abuse Research, monitors social media and traditional data sources. Using big data analytics, it detects emerging drug trends so that public health officials can launch community interventions to prevent the spread of illicit drug use.

**Quality improvement.** PHI may be disclosed for quality improvement activities, such as those facilitated by Minnesota’s Reducing Avoidable Readmissions Effectively (RARE) project. RARE uses hospital claims data to flag potentially preventable readmissions. Hospitals use this information to develop quality improvement interventions and redesign care processes. The RARE project has prevented nearly 8,000 readmissions.

**Patient safety.** Following a U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) codeine prescribing alert, Navy and Marine Corps Public Health Center health analysts staff used health system repository data and big data solutions to analyze prescription rates and determine the prevalence of codeine prescribing practices. The staff determined that providers had not modified their prescribing practices, and subsequently launched an outreach program to share information about the risks identified in the FDA alert, reducing codeine prescriptions in the relevant population by 99% in two months. This intervention is a patient safety activity, permissible under the HIPAA health-care operations exception.

**Improving population health.** PHI can be disclosed for population-based activities related to improving health or reducing costs. Population health management requires patient stratification, or identifying patients who will benefit from targeted interventions. In 2001, Kaiser Permanente Northern California (KPNC) implemented a program to improve a 43.6% hypertension control rate. The program uses data from a central registry to stratify patients, automatically scan that list for gaps in care, and alert local practices when a patient’s hypertension is not controlled. By 2009, hypertension control within KNPC reached 80.4%.

Successful population health management relies on combining demographic, behavioral, and clinical data to develop more effective interventions. At Duke University, researchers integrated census data, county tax-parcel information, crime and housing statistics, and environmental data to support public health projects. One county health department used the database to identify homes at high risk for childhood lead exposure, enabling the targeting of neighborhoods for interventions.

**Outside the framework: unregulated domains**

The legal framework for information privacy does not govern information that is de-identified, patient-generated, or in a nonregulated entity (e.g., a pharmaceutical company)’s possession. The following data sources are examples of data not subject to the health information privacy laws.

**De-identified data.** De-identified information can support health-related activities such as population-based investigations and research, the findings from which can be used to improve health-care quality and delivery. For example, IBM and Belgian pharmaceutical firm UCB collaborated in 2012 to improve epilepsy care. The team is processing 1.5 million epilepsy patients’ de-identified data, which it will use to develop predictive
analytics for use by a physician at the point of care to make treatment recommendations to the patient.

**Patient-generated data.** Individuals generate health information in myriad ways outside traditional healthcare settings. Search engine queries about symptoms, over-the-counter drug purchases made with a pharmacy loyalty card, and social media data are all rich sources of information about an individual’s health that can be used to perform public health functions. Recent examples include a Johns Hopkins program that can accurately predict where and when a flu outbreak will occur based only on tweets. At Boston Children’s Hospital, researchers can predict, track, and map obesity rates at the neighborhood level using only Facebook “likes.”

**Non-regulated entities.** Websites such as PatientsLikeMe. com collect and aggregate health information about individuals for sale and certain uses, such as medical research. When collecting information owned by non-regulated entities, users should be aware that general privacy laws and regulations may apply depending on the state.

**CONCLUSION**

As illustrated, the legal framework governing health information does not impede or prohibit many big data uses that support improvements in public health. Big data technologies can collect, store, and process population data, so that they can be analyzed and shared with stakeholders or de-identified for research and other purposes. Analytics solutions can evaluate population data in real time to stratify patient cohorts, identify high-risk individuals and populations, and alert authorities of potential outbreaks. Using big data solutions, public health authorities can work faster and more efficiently to develop and share knowledge that will improve the public’s health. The legal framework for information privacy does not limit these possibilities, but rather facilitates them.

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